The Need for Imitation
René Girard has taught us that human beings imitate (that is, copy) their desires, opinions and way of life from others, and that the capacity and desire to imitate are essential elements of learning mechanisms, particularly in the case of children.
Girard speaks of mimetic desire. By this expression, I believe, we must understand not only the imitation of others’ desires, but also the desire to imitate, in general, the behaviour and feelings of others – a desire which I call the need for imitation.
I believe, in fact, that human beings have an innate need to imitate their fellow human beings, at least those on whom their survival depends, for the simple reason that without imitating others they would not know how to live, how to learn, how to speak, how to think, how to behave socially – in other words, how to communicate and interact within a community.
When a child is born, their cognitive and rational abilities are practically non-existent, so they can only learn social behaviour through imitation. On the other hand, their cognitive and rational resources, including critical thinking, develop through the imitation of others’ expressions and reasoning. I therefore believe it is impossible to think rationally without resorting to modes of thought learnt by imitation from someone else.
On the other hand, it is clear that perfect imitation (in the sense of an acquired skill) is possible without understanding what is being imitated, that is, what is being copied unconsciously. The result is what Daniel Dennett calls ‘competence without understanding’.
Mirror neurons
The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti’s team has shown that, at least for certain motor gestures, observing an action and performing it activate, in part, the same neural circuits. This makes the idea that there is an innate basis for imitation biologically plausible, and I find it intriguing that it might be linked to the phenomenon described by Girard.
However, we must guard against jumping to conclusions. Mirror neurons have been identified in relation to simple, purposeful motor gestures, and do not in themselves prove the existence of the mimetic desire, which is a cultural and anthropological construct far more complex than a motor reflex. Their role in empathy and rational learning, in particular, remains a matter of controversy amongst neuroscientists and cannot be taken for granted. I therefore cite them as an indication of the biological plausibility of imitation, not as proof of Girard’s theory, which remains a hypothesis within its own domain: that of behaviour and culture.
I suppose, in fact, that the human mind serves above all to copy gestures, language, knowledge, feelings and motivations from other human beings. In general, I would say that humans copy strategies from others to satisfy their needs. This explains the ease with which what we call induced needs develop in an individual. In other words, if an individual copies others, it is not so much because others induce them to do so through force or persuasion (though this may well happen) as because of a spontaneous desire or need on the part of the individual to imitate those on whom their well-being depends, starting with their own parents.
I also suppose that, just as we have a need and an instinct to imitate, so too do we have an innate ability to understand how similar or different the person we are interacting with is to us in terms of thoughts and feelings, and to react accordingly – automatically, involuntarily, in a friendly or hostile manner. We might call this ability a sense of the degree of affinity.
A Re-evaluation of Conformity
The need to imitate is consistent with the fact that human beings are interdependent. Indeed, if there were no such need – and the consequent conformity of individuals to the forms, norms and values of a community – the indispensable cooperation would be impossible.
In light of the above, a re-evaluation of conformity is called for. This, in fact, must not be seen as a (harmful) free and conscious choice, but as a genetically determined imitative drive, that is, an instinct, one of the few remaining to humankind in the course of evolution. In other words, conformism has, in my view, a fundamental and irreplaceable adaptive function for the survival of the individual and the preservation of their species. In summary: we cannot help but imitate; if anything, we can choose whom to imitate.
Given the social function of imitation, alongside the need to imitate external models, we must also consider the need to be imitated – that is, the need for others to conform to the forms, norms and values adopted by the individual, a conformity necessary to enable cooperation. This need to be imitated gives rise to the individual’s intolerance, hostility and aggression towards those who choose models of imitation different from their own, thereby making cooperation impossible and leaving only competition.
We can therefore say that conformism has two sides. On the one hand, there is the need to conform in order to cooperate; on the other, there is the need to combat those who do not wish to conform – and consequently do not wish to cooperate, but only to compete – and who are therefore seen as a threat to the community to which the individual belongs.
Learning narratives
Among the things that a human being is capable of learning – and also of teaching to others – are narratives. These may be religious, esoteric, historical or scientific in nature, or they may relate to folk wisdom on any aspect of practical life.
As Yuval Noah Harari teaches us, humanity’s cultural evolution has taken place primarily thanks to its ability to invent and pass on, from generation to generation, narratives of various kinds (more or less realistic), and to share them collectively as a factor in social cohesion.
This transmission is made possible by our ability to learn abstract concepts through language, especially at a young age, when critical thinking skills are not yet developed and the child is unable to discern whether what they are being told is true or false, well-founded or unfounded. Once the narrative has been internalised as an indispensable factor in social belonging, the adult has no reason to question it; indeed, they will harbour an unconscious fear of doing so. A fear that very few manage to overcome, because it carries the risk of exclusion from the community.
On the other hand, as Nietzsche said, human beings do not need truth to survive, but knowledge (whether true or false) that helps them to survive and thus enables them, first and foremost, to be integrated into a community.
Learning and psychotherapy
Both experiments on primates and the observation of human behaviour show that the ability to learn through imitation (or copying) of others’ gestures and expressions is inversely proportional to the subject’s age; that is, it is greater in the early years of life and tends to disappear in old age. This means that what has been learnt becomes increasingly difficult to unlearn or modify over time. For example, it is very difficult for an adult to unlearn the accent with which they learnt their mother tongue and to learn that of a new language.
This fact is of particular relevance to psychotherapy, as it consists of modifying certain learned patterns (in terms of cognitive, emotional and motivational responses to certain stimuli) considered harmful or inadequate for meeting one’s own needs and those of others. In other words, psychotherapy should consist of learning new social automatisms to replace some of the old ones.
Psychotherapy is, in fact, like learning to play a musical instrument correctly, by reading the notes, after having played it badly by ear for years. One begins with theory – reading the notes – and then it takes a great deal of repetition and practice until the old, bad habits are unlearned and playing well becomes automatic.
Another problem is that learning normally takes place through accumulation, building on the structural foundation of previous learning. It is therefore difficult to learn something that is not consistent with already established mental structures, just as it is very difficult – not to mention traumatic – to alter the foundational structures of a mindset.
Learning through rewards
As children, almost all of us have undergone what I call reward imprinting, that is, we have learnt which of our behaviours bring us pleasure and which bring us pain, especially with regard to affection and approval from others (starting with parents and educators).
For example, those who have been brought up in a strictly disciplined manner tend to regard obedience as a source of social reward. Similarly, those who have had educators who were very demanding from an intellectual point of view tend to regard intelligence and its manifestations as indispensable means of being accepted and loved.
The same phenomenon occurs with other styles of upbringing that emphasise, for example, morality, respect for traditions, religion, sport, beauty, money, competition in general, thrift, and so on, whereby permanent associations (conscious or unconscious) may be formed between these values and the expectation of social reward.
Naturally, as adults, it is possible that the expected rewards may not materialise, or that the results of one’s efforts may prove counterproductive. This can lead to a state of chronic stress and frustration, accompanied by psychological and psychosomatic distress and disorders.
In such cases, psychotherapy aimed at neutralising maladaptive or unrealistic imprints may be helpful. During such therapy, the patient should learn, through interaction with the therapist, alternative ways of obtaining social rewards, and manage to unlearn (this is the most difficult part) the inappropriate associations.
Next chapter: Identity and social qualities (being = belonging = imitating).