Free will

By free will I mean the ability to voluntarily and consciously choose what to do, without any external or internal compulsion.

On the nature and existence of free will theologians, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and nonspecialists have debated and continue to debate for centuries without arriving at a general consensus. The positions of different authors fall between two extremes: the first states that every sane man fully possesses free will; the second states that free will is an illusion since our choices are always decided by unconscious, automatic and involuntary mechanisms and algorithms that depend on genetic predispositions combined with environmental conditioning. In between these extremes we find doubtful, agnostic, possibilist, hybrid, etc. positions.

The prevailing trend on this issue recognizes that our choices are largely determined by genetic and environmental factors over which we have no control. The controversy therefore concerns whether the individual can, to a certain extent and under certain circumstances, overcome these factors by his or her own will. There is a vast literature on the issue, which I do not intend to summarize in this text as it is readily available, even in summary form, on the Internet.

I considered to deal with the topic of free will in this book because I consider it very relevant to the understanding of human nature and psychological and psychotherapeutic mechanisms. In fact, the approach to solving psychological and psychiatric problems differs greatly depending on how one conceives of free will: those who affirm the prevalence of free will over genetic and environmental conditioning are convinced that in order to achieve certain improvements in one’s own and others’ mentality and social relations, one needs above all an effort of will in the desired sense, while those who affirm the non-existence of free will believe that in order to achieve those improvements, one needs to intervene above all in the social environment in general and in particular in the one closest to the individual concerned.

My personal position on the issue is that free will is most likely (but not certainly) illusory, but that, despite its probable nonexistence, it is convenient to consider it really exercisable within very narrow limits. I refer both to the good of the individual concerned and to the good of the society in which he or she lives. Indeed, to affirm with certainty the nonexistence of free will would be to deny all moral responsibility with all the possible negative consequences in human interactions and in the stability of society. In this regard, according to some psychologists, people led to believe less in free will are more likely to behave immorally.

As for the limits of free will, in my conception it boils down to choosing between options defined by external entities or involuntary internal mechanisms, and in the possibility of vetoing all options considered. That is, it would be a matter of making no decision, i.e., doing nothing, which amounts to voluntary immobilization and not following up on any drive.

Outside these limits, in my opinion free will does not exist since we still and necessarily choose what we like best or what comforts or reassures us most, that is, what makes us feel better or less worse, and this is determined by circumstances and the logic on which our mental activity is based. Indeed, no one would choose what makes him feel bad unless that feeling bad has a utility, such as, for example, the atonement of a fault.

Added to this is the fact that the thoughts, feelings and motivations that contribute to determining our choices are generated by automatic, unconscious and involuntary mechanisms. As Schopenhauer said, “Man can do what he wants, but he cannot want what he wants.”

One possibility to escape from the forced choices of our mind might be to entrust to chance the choice among the options that the mind presents to us. But in that case we could no longer speak of free will since it would be chance that would choose for us, and not our conscious self.

More generally, it can be said that everything that happens (including our “voluntary” choices or deemed as such) happens by chance or according to certain laws or logic. There is no third cause because whatever internal or external agent or arbiter we can imagine, this in turn will choose either by chance or by following laws or logics. And the choice between two alternative logics would also occur either randomly or following, in turn, certain laws or logics.

Returning to the relevance of the concept of free will to psychological research and psychotherapy, I find theconscious illusion of free will useful in that it motivates us to seek new ideas and solutions to improve ourselves and others, and it makes us morally responsible. On the other hand, awareness of the limits of free will should make us understanding and tolerant of those who behave in ways we do not agree with. Indeed, we may believe that the ability to exercise free will (however limited) differs from person to person and is not easily modified except by special therapeutic exercises, such as those presented in this book.

The exercise of free will should therefore always be regarded as an attempt at self-control that may fail or succeed depending on circumstances and luck.

In the logical structure of the mind (see the dedicated chapter), free will is located in theconscious self and is its main function in cooperation with the cognitive, emotional and motive subsystems.

See also the chapter Self-government and self-therapy.

Next chapter: Conflicts and synergies between needs – Origin of mental disorders.